

Ex-CIA Agent Tells of Six-Week Peary Course

By NICHOLAS BROWN

A former agent with the Central Intelligence Agency told The Times-Dispatch yesterday that Camp Peary in York County was the CIA's principal training base in the United States when he underwent training there in the 1950s.

He added that through contacts and personal friendships with present employees of the CIA he believes that Camp Peary is still the organization's major training facility.

The former agent, who asked not to be identified, said he participated in a six-week training course at Camp Peary in the Junior Officer's Training Program the CIA held there.

"We would come in on a Monday and stay until Friday," he said. "While you were there you had an assumed name. We took a course in basic intelligence gathering."

The former agent said he did not know of any assassination teams, guerrilla cadres, special warfare agents or nuclear devices at Camp Peary while he was there. Joe Maggio, a former agent with the CIA's covert "Special Operations Division," has maintained that these things exist at the camp, commonly called "the farm" by CIA personnel.

Special weapons, which Maggio has called "mini-nuclear bombs" and said were demonstrated at Camp Peary, were disputed and called "the most preposterous thing of all" by the former agent.

As for the assassination terms, the former agent said, "I would think if the agency had anything like that they would train them overseas." He added that most of Maggio's description of the activities on the base "sounds like James Bond to me."

The CIA's purpose for existing, the former agent said, "is to gather intelligence information and disseminate it to the proper officials of government." In the 1950s, the former agent said, the CIA also dealt in counterespionage overseas.

The former agent also said that during his association with the CIA it was quite possible that foreign nationals were brought to Camp Peary for "debriefings."

He said that while at the camp for training, agents wore military fatigue uniforms. While he was there, he said, the population of the camp consisted of several CIA instructors, a cooking staff, a contingent of military police, and the 50 or so students. There was both a six-week course and a three-month course.

One exercise the agent recalled was named "Rabbit" and required him to trail someone. He said he had to follow this person to Richmond and place him under surveillance in the city.

Another exercise used facsimiles of the borders of Eastern European countries.

There was an activity called "Operation Holecloth" which organized an intelligence program that included trying to recruit an agent.

"Dead Drop" Cited

Much of the former agent's training at Camp Peary was spent in learning intelligence techniques and terminology. For example, he said the term "dead drop" meant leaving a secret message in a designated place for another agent.

The former agent said he thought it was "common knowledge" that the CIA operated a training facility at Camp Peary, and he said he could "think of no reason why they wouldn't admit" having a base there.

In recalling his former experience with the CIA, however, the former agent surmised that one aspect of the agency hasn't changed over the years.

"Security is pretty damn rigid," he said.

STATINTL

11-17 August 1972

MIAMI BOMB PLOT

Democratic Party wiretapping linked to CIA assassins

STATINTL

ART KUNKIN

Less than two weeks before the opening of the Republican National Convention, a press conference held at the Los Angeles Press Club heard a woman speaker say that the five men caught wiretapping the Democratic Party National Committee headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel were not only involved in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and President Kennedy's assassination but also with plans first revealed last year by Los Angeles Police informer Louis Tackwood to disrupt the Republican National Convention. (See the *Los Angeles Free Press*, October 22, 1971.)

These charges were made by Mae Brussell, a well known private investigator into American political assassinations for the past nine years. She was accompanied by Michael McCarthy of the Citizens Research Investigation Committee, one of the CRIC investigators who originally checked out Tackwood's charges, and Paul Krassner, editor of *The Realist*. The current issue of *The Realist* (August, 1972) contains a 20-page article by Ms. Brussels which was distributed to the newsmen at the press conference as the basis for Ms. Brussels' assertions.

According to Ms. Brussell the Watergate Hotel, located in Washington, D.C., was the home of John and Martha Mitchell at the time of the attempted wiretapping of the Democratic Party National Committee. John Mitchell, former Attorney General of the United States, had shortly before resigned that prestigious position to head the important Committee to Re-Elect the President.

Also housed in the Watergate Hotel complex are the offices of the Democratic National Committee.

In the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, five men were arrested removing parts of the ceiling from the sixth floor panels in the Democratic National Headquarters. These men possessed expensive electronic equipment, cameras, walkie-talkies, burglary tools, and other James Bond accessories.

Two of the men arrested had in their possession the telephone number of Howard Hunt, White House consultant who had previously worked with the CIA for 21 years.

James McCord, Jr., employed as Chief of Security for Mitchell's Committee to Re-Elect Richard Nixon, was one of the five men arrested. McCord was formerly employed by the CIA for nineteen years, having left two years previously at approximately the same time as Hunt. McCord's position with the CIA was Chief of Security over the entire grounds of the immense CIA compound at Langley, Virginia. According to Mae Brussell, this put McCord in a very high, responsible position in relation to CIA Director Helms who could not conceivably carry out any intelligence planning without relying on McCord to ensure that CIA plans were kept secret.

Nine persons (all registered with false names suspiciously similar to names used in novels written by Howard Hunt) stayed at the Watergate Hotel May 26 to 29, and again June 17 and 18. Five of them, the night of their arrest, were discovered in the Democratic Party

Wills noticed pieces of scotch tape over the door locks. Washington police arrived and made the arrests.

According to Don Freed of CRIC (who was not at the press conference but submitted additional material to the *Free Press*), within six weeks of the first arrests it was known that at least 12 men and \$114,000 were involved, and that the invaders were discovered putting forged documents of some kind into files, not taking papers out. They were not burglars, they were not functioning with a "bugging" budget or with the numbers usually associated with mere wiretapping.

(We must caution, however, that the *Free Press* has no means at present of independently verifying facts such as documents being planted instead of being removed, and that Don Freed, evidently, bases much of his information on a collation from such sources as the *Washington Post*, which has published carefully documented articles on the raid. Freed has also made investigative trips to Washington, D.C.).

Following the raid, a million dollar suit was filed by the Democrats against the Committee for the Re-Election of the President for compensatory and punitive damages to the Democratic headquarters. The Nixon Committee then asked a U.S. District Court to postpone the suit until after the November 7th election. To hear the suit before the election, the Committee said, could deter campaign workers and contributions, force disclosure of confidential information and otherwise cause "incalculable damage" to President Nixon's campaign.

continued

NEWSWEEK
5 JUL 1972

CAPERS:

Operation Watergate

They wore surgical gloves and carried walkie-talkies, a pair of cameras and electronic bugging devices. They picked a lock on a basement door, left the latch taped open and made their way up a rear stairwell of a building in Washington's elegant Watergate complex to the sixth floor. There the five men jimmied a door to the Democratic National Committee headquarters, slipped inside and began rifling the files, stuffing some documents in boxes, dumping others out on the floor. They made just one mistake: when the night watchman removed the tape on the downstairs door, one of the intruders put it back—and when the watchman checked the door again, he promptly called the police. Within minutes, three cops from the Capital's plain-clothes "mod" squad burst in on the intruders with guns drawn. "Don't shoot," one of the five shouted. "You've got us."

They had indeed—and with the arrests, Washington had one of the juiciest political scandals in memory. Four of the five intruders turned out to have been either agents or operatives for the Central Intelligence Agency. And one of the men, James W. McCord, 53, of Rockville, Md., happened to be both security coordinator for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and a security consultant for the Republican National Committee. To add to the embarrassment of the Administration, both committees immediately announced that McCord had resigned some months ago—only to find out that he was indeed working for them right up to the time of his arrest.

Integrity: At first, the White House simply tried to ignore the affair. The Justice Department announced that the FBI had entered the case, and that a grand jury was ready to receive evidence. High-ranking Republicans vigorously denied that the party had any hand in the raid. "There is no place in our campaign or in the electoral process for this type of activity," declared former Attorney General John Mitchell, now the head of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. "We will not permit or condone it." The Democrats howled nonetheless—and not without a note of glee. "This incident raises the ugliest questions about the integrity of the political process that I have encountered in a quarter of a century," proclaimed Democratic National Committee chairman Lawrence O'Brien, who promptly filed a \$1 million damage suit against the GOP campaign committee. "There is certainly a clear line to the Committee to Re-Elect the President—and there is developing a clear line to the White House."

The lines to the CIA were clear enough. One of the group, a Cuban named Virgilio R. Gonzales, 45, appears

to have been just a simple Miami locksmith recruited for the job. But a second Cuban, Miami realtor Eugenio Martinez, had worked for the agency smuggling refugees out of Castro's Cuba. A third, Frank Fiorini—who also went by the name Frank Sturgis and several dozen known aliases—was a U.S. marine turned soldier-of-fortune who once smuggled guns for Castro's rebel army, then turned against the dictator and joined the CIA. Bernard Barker, 55, who employed Martinez, was a wealthy, Cuban-born U.S. citizen, well known in Washington GOP circles. Barker served, under the code name "Macho," as one of the key links between the CIA and Cuban exiles training in Guatemala for the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. McCord himself, before he retired two years ago to set up his own security agency, spent nineteen years in the CIA security force, safeguarding agency installations.

'Mission Impossible': All except McCord, it developed, checked into the plush Watergate Hotel, next to the office building, the day before the raid. Authorities picking through their quarters later found what looked like a make-up room for TV's "Mission Impossible." Among other things, police confiscated a kit full of burglary tools, two pairs of gray work overalls, a wig and a radio transceiver. But the most intriguing items seized were a pair of address books listing the name Everette Howard Hunt—with the notation beside it, "W.H." and "W. House."

Until recently, Hunt worked as a \$100-a-day consultant for White House troubleshooter Charles W. Colson. Colson hired Hunt during the Pentagon papers furor last summer, probably to look for information leaks. And Hunt brought a wealth of experience to the task. For 21 years, the suave, Ivy League New Yorker was a CIA field man in Latin America, Spain and the Far East, churning out no fewer than 45 science fiction, spy and detective novels in his spare time. Significantly, Hunt served as Barker's boss in the preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion. When he retired two years ago, the career spy went to work for Robert R. Mullen & Co., a Washington-based public-relations firm whose close ties to Republican Party leaders gave it ready access to the White House. Informed by phone that his name had been linked to the case, Hunt reportedly blurted, "Good God!", hung up—and then dropped out of sight.

Still, his name alone was enough to suggest a link to the White House, and the Administration reacted with suitable horror. Colson, Hunt's old patron, heard the news and roared, "Guilt by association!" Presidential press secretary Ron Ziegler first declined to comment on "a third-rate burglary attempt," then upgraded it to "second-rate" and said the White House had no involvement whatsoever in this particular incident. Finally, at his own first news conference in three months, President Nixon himself said flatly, "The White

House has had no involvement whatsoever in this particular incident."

But that declaration hardly put an end to the speculation. Theories about what the five intruders were doing—and who ordered it done—swept through Washington like Hurricane Agnes. Democratic insiders, skeptical of the FBI's investigation ("Hell, they're investigating their own people"), claimed that the raid was a GOP-inspired fishing expedition, perhaps with the additional purpose of replacing a malfunctioning bug that had been installed earlier. A more measured version suggested that someone—Republicans or others—believed the Democrats were in possession of an extremely damaging document—a hot new chapter in the HITT affair, perhaps—and sent the five men in to get it. But authorities were still not discounting the possibility that the raid may have been the brainchild of anti-Castro Cuban extremists who feared that the Democrats were planning to ease relations with Cuba.

At the weekend, authorities were looking into possible links between this raid and two earlier burglaries of the Democratic headquarters—one of which took place while the same four Cubans were registered at Watergate Hotel. And the Committee for the Re-election put some private eyes out conducting an investigation of its own. As one worried White House staffer put it, "The only way we can prove we're not guilty is to find out who is guilty."

STATINTL

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Ten O'Clock News

STATION WTTG TV

DATE November 21, 1971

10:00 PM

CITY Washington, DC

OPERATION GINO

NEWSCASTER: Speaking of curtains, syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reports how the CIA's security curtain was breached by a group of little boys.

JACK ANDERSON: The legendary security of the Central Intelligence Agency has been penetrated by a secret spy mission called Operation Gino.

Here is the hush-hush story. The CIA enclave is enclosed by cyclone fencing and protected by electronic detection devices. Guards swarm all over the place. The only way to get inside is through the main gate which is carefully watched by the security men. But four schoolboys, led by 11-year old Stewart Andrews of McLean, Virginia found a series of manholes in an old federal road testing facility near the CIA. They got the covers off and explored the underground tunnels. Their subterranean travels took them past the great security wall and up into secret CIA territory.

They went back day after day, telling their parents mysteriously, they were engaged in Operation Gino.

But the manhole covers were overgrown with greenery and the boys soon broke out in a familiar rash. The rash led to more probing questions from their parents. Thus was Operation Gino foiled by a case of poison ivy.

The CIA deals in operations so secret that its waste paper is classified. Yet it receives more publicity than government agencies that advertise. So, understandably, the CIA isn't saying anything about the schoolboys who infiltrated their headquarters.

But maybe the CIA security wasn't so bad after all. Perhaps the poison ivy was a CIA plant.

This is Jack Anderson in Washington.

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Firms Cautious About Bombings

By Robert McLeod

Some urban office buildings now have security procedures to rival even the Pentagon's elaborate precautions, according to a report released today by the Conference Board.

Bombings are becoming a way of life for corporate America, according to E. Patrick McGuire, author of the study by the private business survey firm.

Nine out of ten major U.S. firms have received bomb threats, and a bomb explodes on an average of once every two hours, the report said.

But companies are learning to cope with corporate terrorism.

Visitors are electronically probed, McGuire said, briefcases are inspected, and often an armed guard will escort the visitor to his destination.

The reasoning behind bombings are no longer the simple need for revenge, nor the criminal motivations of the past. Now large numbers of bombings can be traced directly to anger or frustration over social issues, such as Vietnam.

And as the reasoning changes, so do the bombers. Unlike terrorists of the past, today's bomber is less likely to have a criminal record, is better edu-

cated, and is vastly more difficult to trace.

U.S. Treasury data reveals that in about 65 percent of all bombings, the perpetrators go undetected.

Explosives are easy to come by, the report shows, and anyone who can't find the materials, isn't trying very hard.

Explosives produced for legitimate use now amount to more than 2 billion pounds per year, and dynamite can be purchased through thousands of retail stores by showing no more than a driver's license.

Bomb builders who don't obtain the explosive from legitimate dealers can go to a rapidly growing black market, or he can simply steal them. In a few cases, even the C.I.A. and the Defense Department were identified as inadvertent suppliers of materials.

The report also notes that it is simple for would-be terrorists to learn to make explosive devices by reading the underground papers which have supplied step-by-step guidance on how to make bombs.

Then, there's always the Government Printing Office, which will supply unclassified Defense Department manuals on booby traps and constructing explosive devices.

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RAND SAFEGUARDS CALLED STRICTER THAN PENTAGON'S

BY GEORGE REASONS

Times Staff Writer

Daniel Ellsberg who says he leaked the top secret Pentagon papers to the press would have found access to them easier at the Pentagon than at Rand Corp., a former Rand scientist said Friday.

"Rand security is tighter than security at the Pentagon," Dr. Bernard Brodie said. "And you can quote me."

Brodie, who worked at the Santa Monica "think tank" for 15 years and also on national security projects at the Pentagon, accused Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird of unjustly "punishing" Rand by taking security custody of all secret documents away from the agency.

Laird said Rand security was "lax" and could not be tolerated.

His action came in the wake of the scandal surrounding the Pentagon papers. Rand had custody of two sets while Ellsberg was employed there in 1969.

The two Rand sets were recalled after Ellsberg disclosed that it was he who leaked them.

Brodie said Laird's action in clamping a security lid on Rand was "unreasonable and petty, a grandstand play."

"Laird is acting sore, that's all."

He said Laird should look to his own organization for comparison.

"Anyone can go in the Pentagon and walk around without being challenged except in a few sections such as the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," said Brodie, a UCLA political science professor who still serves as consultant to Rand.

"Every Pentagon office has classified material in it," he said. "It's handled carefully but anyone can go in."

Another Agrees

Another former Rand researcher, who declined to be identified, backed Brodie's remarks about comparative security based on 10 years of association both at the Pentagon and Rand.

"I have been in and out of the Pentagon and other defense agencies and found you can walk up to the very office of Laird without anybody checking you out," he said.

"The only one who stops you is his female secretary in the outer office. There are classified documents in every room—and the safes are open," he said.

"The only rule is that someone must be present in the room if the safe is open, but it can be only the female secretary."

He said security at the State Department was about as lax.

"There is an entrance for diplomats who can enter without an appointment and another working entrance at which visitors must have an appointment which is verified by the receptionist."

"She issues a pass which is surrendered to the guard when you enter and then the visitor is on his own to wander around. No one knows whether he works there or not."

At Rand, the controls are much tighter, the two former researchers said. They outlined the system this way:

There are guards on all three doors. The arrival and departure of employees, who must show their pass, is recorded on a tape recorder.

Visitors must have an appointment to be admitted. Their arrival is recorded on a log on which is noted their names, whom they are calling on, whom they represent, whether they are American citizens and whether they will be discussing classified information.

Waits for Escort

After verifying that he has an appointment, the guard issues the visitor a red badge bearing his name and holds him at the entrance until an escort arrives. He can take his briefcase but must leave camera and tape recorder behind.

No outsider without an escort is permitted in the

sified documents are used. He goes literally nowhere alone.

If a visitor goes to the restroom, his escort stands outside the door.

Even new employees whose security clearances have not yet been approved are confined to a so-called "clear area" out of reach of classified information. The clear area is on the first floor near the main entrance.

If the visitor is going to discuss classified information, a clearance authorizing it must have been submitted and approved beforehand.

If he is not cleared, his host must take all classi-

fied documents in his possession and place them in his special safe and lock it.

Those procedures are required even though visitors frequently are officials from such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force or State Department and hold top secret security clearances.

If the visitor leaves Rand for lunch, he surrenders his badge at the door and his departure is noted in the log. When he returns, he must pin the badge back on.

To check out a top secret document, a Rand staff member must have the appropriate security clearance and must justify his request at the top secret control room by supplying the number of the project on which he is working which attests to his "need to know."

He cannot check out top secret documents unrelated to his project. He must sign for his document on an IBM card which records the document's location.

He is responsible for the document until he returns it to the control room.

Researchers must follow strict procedures to safeguard documents in their possession. Guards periodically patrol the offices, note infractions and re-

Too many violations and the offender is fired or demoted to work not involving classified information.

No one can leave this office unless all top secret documents are locked in his safe.

Those whose offices are on the first floor with windows facing the street are forbidden from leaving the room with classified information on their desks. Neither can they leave their safes open.

A top secret document cannot leave the office of the man who checked it out. He cannot give it to a colleague until he establishes that he has the proper security clearance and

fills out a transfer form noting it changed hands.

A copy of the form goes to the control room.

Except for a dozen researchers who are working on crash studies, top secret documents must be returned to the control room at night.

Those who retain possession keep the documents in a special tamper-proof file "safe" with a combination lock. Less sensitive documents may be kept by any researcher in his locked file cabinet.

Only the researcher and one other person knows the combination. It must be memorized. To write it down is a security violation.

The combination is changed every year.

Pentagon Safes

(According to Brodie, there are safes all over the Pentagon in which top secret documents are kept. He said there is no requirement for top secret documents to be returned to the control room at the end of the day.)

Every six months at Rand, the top secret control room makes a periodic check of outstanding documents to verify their location.

Removal of classified material from the premises is forbidden but Brodie admitted guards do not check the brief cases of researchers when they leave.

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JUN 17 1971

Thief's Dream Is Airport Mail

By Myron S. Waldman
Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington—A convicted thief told senators yesterday that he had robbed the airport mails of more than \$100,000,000, operating with such abandon that he would frequently steal top secret government documents by accident along with unclassified loot.

Robert F. Cudak, of Baldwin, L.I., said that he stole cupfuls of diamonds and Department of Defense plans for a land-to-air ballistics missile. He stole carloads of furs and the prototype of a new military pistol. He stole bearer bonds and an FBI list of Cuban nationalists and agents in Miami, complete with names and addresses of informants. He stole travelers' checks and an entire military pouch headed for an Air Force base. The classified material, he said, came from the Defense Department, the CIA and the FBI. "I don't think we've seen any Marine stuff," Cudak said.

Many of Cudak's activities were described by Newsday reporter Tom Renner last year in a series of articles on mail theft that called Cudak "the world's most successful mail thief." Yesterday, Cudak gave the details of his operations to the Senate permanent investigations subcommittee. He was under heavy guard and a court order of immunity from further prosecution.

Served 7 Years

Cudak, whose address was 2318 Milburn Ave. before he began serving a seven-year sentence for mail theft last year, told the subcommittee that he had stolen classified materials about 20 times. "You mean, it is just as easy to steal classified material as it is stocks, bonds, jewels, furs and other things you stole?" Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.) asked.

"Sure," Cudak replied. "That stuff was placed alongside the securities and the jewelry. It was treated like the same thing." But, Percy asked, wasn't it marked confidential? "Many times," Cudak responded. He added that some

of the documents were sent by registered mail and a few, lying in mail sacks, were marked, "Hand Deliver Only."

"What you're saying is that these documents could have easily been sold to the New York Times or foreign agents or anyone else?" Percy asked. "Sure," Cudak said. "It [the mail sacks] had a lot of stuff in it."

But Cudak said that he wanted to make one thing clear. "First of all," he said, "I want to say that neither I or my associates ever tried to move any of this stuff, but I looked at some of it because my curiosity got the best of me."

"I was scared of it, I was afraid of it. I would burn it or throw it in the water. I know one time, when I first started, they recovered some of this stuff and they made a big stink over it. It was in September of 1967 and they got kind of excited because this stuff was lying around."

On one occasion, he said, Albert DeAngelis of Woodside, who he said was one of his fences and who is associated with the Carlo Gambino family, warned him to stay away from his principal hunting ground, the John F. Kennedy Airport. That, he said, was because Army Intelligence agents were conducting an investigation of the thefts there. Asked how DeAngelis might know of that, Cudak replied, "He said he had a lodge brother who was an FBI agent."

Cudak, who listed his associates, many of them from Long Island, claimed that, while he had to use mob figures as fences, he himself remained an independent operator. He told the committee of a youthful criminal career that led to airport mail theft when he got a job as a ramp man for Northwest Airlines at Kennedy Airport. Within a few days, he said, he saw how lax security was and he began to steal from the mails.

Stealing Was More Profitable

"I enjoyed the job," Cudak said. "Besides the stealing, I was at the airport." But theft definitely

was more profitable. "Between that and my return to prison in September of 1970," he reminisced, "I estimate that my partners and I systematically stole from Railway Express, air freight and both regular and registered mail, approximately \$100,000,000 in stocks, bonds, jewelry, cash, furs and other valuable items."

Cudak's share of the loot after fences, he said, came to about \$1,000,000. "I am penniless today," the lean, sideburned 29-year-old thief said. "I gambled most of the money away as soon as I received my share from the fences. At first, my partners and I gambled heavily in the New York City area . . . Then we found Las Vegas. We lost at the blackjack tables, in the keno rooms and at the dice tables . . ."

In detailing some of his 125 thefts, Cudak said that he stole from Kennedy Airport about 90 times, from LaGuardia about 10 times, and a number of times from airports ranging from Florida to Los Angeles. "Anyone dressed as a ramp man or airline employee can come along and grab any or all of the bags without being questioned," he said.

Sometimes, he said, he and his associates stole from each other. On Sept. 13, 1967, he said, he and one James Sanatar, whose address he gave as 255 Irving Ave., Deer Park, stole four bags of registered mail. At Sanatar's house, he said, they opened the bags and filled a suitcase with common stock, bearer bonds and treasury notes.

"We filled a teacup with diamonds ranging from a half a carat to two or three carats each," Cudak said. "One package held a 16-carat marquis diamond. I managed to slip that diamond into my pocket before Jimmy Sanatar saw it."

Associates Listed

Besides Sanatar and DeAngelis, Cudak listed as among his Long Island associates: one James V. Schaefer, whose address was given as 250 West Merriek Rd., Freeport; a William D. Ricchiuti, 45, of 99 Round Tree Dr., Plainview, who, he said, was "the most important of my partners," and one Vincent Pisano whose address was given as 254 Monroe Blvd., Valley Stream. He said that his principal fences on Long Island were Pisano, one Harvey Sapperstein of Bayside; one Jack Molitz of Westbury and one Leonard Mastrogiacono of Great Neck.

Subcommittee Chairman John McClellan (D-Ark.) declared that Cudak was "telling the truth as far as his memory permits." The senator would not permit television or still cameras to take pictures of the witness, saying, "This man has a problem of safety for his life and we want to keep our promise to him."

CIA Emptied By Bomb Threat

Employees in the McLean headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency were evacuated for more than an hour last night after a man called the switchboard around 7:30 p.m. and said a bomb was hidden in the building.

CIA security guards searched the building while Fairfax County police checked the identification of persons leaving the CIA compound, but no bomb was found.

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Protection for officials

14 JAN 1971

U.S. tightens security guard

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

A greatly intensified effort to protect public servants from politically motivated harm has been undertaken by the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The chief members of the government here, as well as the personnel of foreign embassies in Washington and American embassies abroad, are being given a rapidly expanded guard.

Meanwhile, programs to train specialized police and intelligence agents for this purpose are proceeding under forced draft.

Very little is being said in public about this effort, lest ideas for blackmailing governments and their officials be planted in militant or unstable minds. The results of the intensified protection are visible as well as known to Washington news correspondents, however.

The issue is pointed up by the Berrigan affair which now is being given wide publicity because it is unavoidable, in view of a public grand jury indictment, and because it shows what is represented by the indictment as successful police work by the FBI.

Kidnap plot charged

Charged with conspiracy, the accused have to be considered innocent unless their forthcoming court trial results in a guilty verdict for any of seven indictments, which presume the possibility of conspiracy to blow up the heating pipes for some federal buildings here, and thereafter to kidnap Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger.

It is assumed by the FBI that an anti-war group calling itself the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives including a number of Roman Catholic priests like the Rev. Philip F. Berrigan, a former priest, and a nun who were included in the indictment, is not pacifist as claimed, but willing to commit crimes to try to stop the fighting in Vietnam.

This is denied by those of the defendants who have spoken publicly, and by other members of the so-called East Coast Conspiracy.

Without drawing any conclusions from this case, which is yet to be tried, it shows the greatly enlarged effort of the FBI to deal with the dangers of a period in which both normal and abnormal persons have been increasingly involved with violence because of the violence of the Vietnam war.

Legal violence

There are many cases, some disclosed, others kept quiet, and still more before the courts, in which a kidnapping plot has

been declared against governments and their hitherto vulnerable top men. It is conducted by persons and groups who are willing to use illegal violence to protest what the government considers to be a legal form of violence in the Vietnam war.

Without attempting a judgment on the political and social questions involved, or the legal questions, the result has been a wave of efforts to blackmail governments on the part of frustrated citizens.

Americans are highly conscious of the three assassinations of two Kennedys and Dr. Martin Luther King, and of the hijacking of airplanes in the recent Jordanian crisis. They have heard of the kidnappings of American, British, Canadian, and Latin-American diplomats and public figures. They have been told that security agents now are flying on American international plane routes.

'Social causes'

What they have not seen is the guards accompanying many more officials than Mr. Kissinger, or standing outside embassies here.

In his most recent issue of Uniform Crime Reports, FBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover makes a discreet reference to the "social causes" along with other causes of the sharp increase in crime in the past year. He refers to controversial legislation passed by Congress and state legislatures, which he calls "positive action" to meet, among other things, "civil disorder crises."

He does not mention the sharp increase in agents of his and other protection agencies, which appear only in legislative appropriations.

The questions which arise of protecting innocent persons from a wave of new security measures and from public pressures to solve crimes of this sort are yet unanswered and only began to be discussed by the expiring Congress in any detail.

But the known and unavowed incidents of the new kinds of guerrilla war are pressing on the police and they are responding under counterpressure.

A new era embracing new levels and techniques of law enforcement, along with its attendant problems of personal liberty and defense of the innocent, seems to be opened. Whether it will abate with the winding down of the Vietnam war, assuming that takes place as hoped, remains to be seen.